In June 2015 Lorraine Hope, Joanne Rechdan and Andrew Clark, among others from the University of Portsmouth attended the Society for Applied Research Memory and Cognition (SARMAC) conference in Victoria, British Colombia, Canada.

Below you will find the abstracts for each of our talks.

Lorraine Hope

Title: Metacognition at the sharp end: Examining free and cued recall performance as a function of active response role

Abstract: Investigations following critical events often depend on accurate and detailed recall accounts from operationally active witnesses (e.g., police officers, military personnel, emergency responders). Such events are challenging and place additional cognitive demands on operational witnesses that may impair subsequent recall and memory monitoring.  We compared the free and cued recall performance of 80 operational witnesses with that of non-operational observers for a simulated scenario involving an armed perpetrator.  Operational witnesses reported significantly fewer correct details about the critical phase of the scenario, provided less detailed responses to questions and used Don’t Know responses differently than their non-operational counterparts. 

Joanne Rechdan

Title: The effects of social comparative feedback on grain size and confidence in eyewitness reports

Abstract: Social interaction can affect eyewitness reports and, more broadly, individuals’ metacognitive processes. We investigated how social comparative feedback affects the metacognitive processes underlying the strategic regulation of eyewitness memory reports. In Study 1, participants received negative, positive, or no feedback about a co-witness’s performance on a recall task. Participants exposed to negative or positive feedback reported more fine grain details than those in the control group. Selection of fine grain responses was positively correlated with participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their answers. The effect of more salient, self-relevant feedback was examined in Study 2.

Andrew Clark

Title: The consequences of not believing: Do non-believed memories result in memory omissions?

Abstract: Non-believed memories are a phenomenon whereby people continue to report having a memory for an event they no longer believe occurred. Our research examines the consequences of non-believed memories and, drawing on Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), explores whether non-believed memories result in people withholding or omitting memories of past experiences. In two studies, we induced memory omissions and asked participants to rate belief and memory strength. The results of Study 1 suggest that when omissions occurred, there was no dissociation between belief and memory. Using a confederate, Study 2 examined the extent to which non-believed memories are a social phenomenon.